Trump’s sanctions against the International Criminal Court undermine justice
The United States is not simply declining to uphold international law; it is imposing costs on others for attempting to uphold it.
I was in Dubrovnik, Croatia, at a workshop focused on war crimes prevention, when we received the news that Navi Pillay had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her lifelong dedication to international law and accountability for war crimes.
Our celebration was short-lived. The same day, the Trump administration announced sweeping sanctions against the International Criminal Court.
The contrast was striking. Whereas the Nobel committee recognized Pillay’s achievements and the importance of international law, Washington escalated its assault on an institution that issued arrest warrants against both Israeli and Hamas leaders for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Trump himself later made clear the purpose of the move. When Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the decision, Trump interrupted him: “ He is trying to defend [Benjamin Netanyahu] and various other people.”
These sanctions expose a deeper pattern: an administration willing to act unilaterally abroad, then scramble to manage the consequences of its own decisions, compounding crises rather than resolving them. The administration is not only shielding allies from scrutiny. Its determination to shield American actions from international accountability also raises concerns about scrutiny of its own actions — in the war on Iran, in extrajudicial killings in the Caribbean and beyond.
These sanctions are not a symbolic gesture. The court relies on banks, payment systems, technology providers and commercial services. Restrictions jeopardize staff payments, secure systems, evidence preservation and investigations.
The implications for victims and witnesses are also direct and substantial. International criminal investigations depend on gathering and protecting sensitive testimony and ensuring survivors can participate without exposing themselves to further danger. Disrupting those functions would affect the people who depend on the court.
French Judge Nicolas Guillou, sanctioned in 2025, described how his bank restricted payment services and European institutions struggled to reimburse his travel expenses. The disruption extended to digital services. Fearing U.S. sanctions, institutions may avoid transactions even when they are legally permitted.
The International Criminal Court has no police force. It depends on member states to cooperate with investigations and execute arrest warrants — including those against Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin. Sanctions do not invalidate warrants but can compound obstacles to enforcement. The U.S. is not simply declining to uphold international law — it is imposing costs on others for attempting to uphold it.
On the same day that he sanctioned the International Criminal Court, Trump announced a new arrangement for Russia to supply diesel to international markets — including the U.S. Although it is intended to relieve soaring energy prices aggravated by the U.S. war with Iran, this move could generate revenue for Putin’s war in Ukraine. The message was appallingly clear — the U.S. government is willing to work with alleged international war criminals even as it targets those seeking to hold them accountable.
These choices erode leverage, credibility and the capacity to manage shared threats. Freedom from constraints does not necessarily mean greater influence. Weakening institutions does not end crises. The administration is not simply failing to extinguish crises — its responses are spreading their consequences across regions, economies and institutions.
To check Trump’s recklessness, other nations can and should respond strongly. The European Parliament has just awarded its 2026 prize for Freedom of Thought to the International Criminal Court and its officials. It is a good gesture, and one that should be backed up by more concrete action.
Guillou has called on the European Union to invoke its blocking statute , designed to protect European operators from the extraterritorial effects of foreign sanctions. It could extend protections against the U.S. measures targeting the court, prohibit covered European companies and financial institutions from complying with specified restrictions and provide remedies for those harmed.
The blocking statute cannot fully erase exposure to U.S. jurisdiction. But it would establish that European governments will not allow American economic coercion to dictate whether an international court they established can function.
The European Commission has considered this option, and France has indicated its readiness to use the mechanism. But those commitments need implementation.
In the U.S., members of Congress should unequivocally condemn and reverse the sanctions, including previous designations targeting the court’s judges and prosecutors. They must scrutinize the administration’s use of financial and security leverage to pressure governments fulfilling their international legal obligations.
When the U.S. acts as an international bully and an enforcer on behalf of leaders like Netanyahu and Putin, who are wanted for war crimes, it has a massive chilling effect that takes aim at fundamental hopes for international peace, justice and coexistence.
Dubrovnik’s Old Town is now bustling with life after enduring siege, bombardment and war crimes during the 1991-1992 war in the former Yugoslavia. International tribunals prosecuted those responsible for war crimes there and elsewhere, demonstrating that the institutions now under attack by Trump have real purpose.
We have made progress in building mechanisms to prevent atrocities and pursue justice, but that progress is neither inevitable nor irreversible. We have seen time and again that a world in which the most powerful can do whatever they want, regardless of damage or destruction, is one in which all people are vulnerable.
Trump’s attempts to dismantle international institutions of justice must be fiercely resisted and rejected.
Nancy Okail is president and CEO of the Center for International Policy.
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