9/11 showed we must always be looking toward the next threat

Twenty-five years ago, the 9/11 terrorist attacks killed 2,977 people and left us with profound questions about our security that redound to this day. The 9/11 Commission Report , a best-selling book at the time, explained how failures of imagination, management, capability and policy contributed to our failure to prevent the attacks. The existing national security system at that time had been built for Cold War threats — fighter aircraft, tanks, uniformed soldiers and conventional warfare. But a new threat had emerged, utilizing truck bombs, training recruits in caves and manipulating technology to battle in asymmetric environments. Al Qaeda, a regional terrorist group, had been deploying new challenges to the U.S. around the world throughout the 1990s. It attacked U.S. embassies in Africa with truck bombs and hit the USS Cole with explosives in a small boat. It also attempted to topple a building in New York City . U.S. security policies did not adapt fast enough, nor did our institutions change quickly enough, to counter a dynamic adversary testing our aging and vulnerable defenses. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission, led by Republican Chairman Tom Kean and Democratic Vice Chair Lee Hamilton, faced long odds on a polarized Capitol Hill and before a frightened public. After working with Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) to create the 9/11 Commission, I found myself serving on it and keenly recognized our time and budget constraints. Like most blue-ribbon commissions, we had very limited time. Even if we figured out the answers, we would face the significant problem of trying to pass our policy recommendations into law. Fortunately, we had several wise policy makers on the commission, with legislative experience in state and federal government, and a highly talented non-partisan staff. Importantly, we also had support from the 9/11 family members in New York, New Jersey and Virginia. They did the important and praiseworthy work of holding our feet to the fire, insisting on full accountability and transparency. And once we had finished, they relentlessly and energetically pushed members of Congress and the White House to embrace our policy recommendations and pass them into law. The 9/11 Commission proposed more than three dozen major policy recommendations. New and more agile organizations were created; many old stovepipes and bureaucratic structures were eliminated; and a multi-layered joint federal-state-local architecture was set up to encourage sharing information and integrating intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence was created to coordinate and manage the 17 various intelligence agencies across the government — to execute on long-term strategy and keep short-term politics out of the national security equation. The commission also recommended establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center staffed with experienced personnel from various agencies to enforce the practice of joint duty. We could not afford to have the FBI and CIA not sharing sensitive information with each other. REAL IDs were proposed across all 50 states for improving security, and the FBI instructed to build a new national security workforce with broad linguistic skills and deep analytical abilities. Aviation security was paramount, since the terrorists had repeatedly targeted aircraft. Screening systems that prevent suspects from boarding planes or entering the country were included in our extensive commercial airline travel system for the first time. There were about 16 names on the “No-Fly List” prior to 9/11 — today that list today includes thousands, and TSA officers provide a vital national security function. Early on, we discussed legislative strategy to engage Congress and persuade a skeptical White House to support our proposals. The 9/11 family organizations swarmed the Hill and invaded offices to persuade members to vote for our new ideas. Bipartisan leadership also stepped up in Congress. Sens. McCain, Susan Collins (R-Maine), Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) and House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) were all key to formulating and passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law. To this day, our new system has performed well — we have not experienced another such attack. But Congress failed to enact a key proposal for itself. Experts informed the commission that Congress that 92 various committees and subcommittees maintained some jurisdiction over homeland security. When everyone claims oversight, no one really has responsibility. Threats continue to evolve as corporations, universities, critical infrastructure and electrical and water grids are all experiencing cyberattacks. Last month, seven states reported serious attacks on water and utility related infrastructure. Iran, China, and Russia are likely culprits — all have serious capabilities in this area and a recent history of launching cyberattacks against the U.S. If the 9/11 attacks hit our airport infrastructure, today’s soft underbelly is our digital infrastructure. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency was created in 2019 to protect us from this threat, but it currently has only an acting director (not confirmed) and its professional staff has been reduced by one-third . The Iran War invites more cybersecurity concerns for the homeland as we interface with old infrastructure to protect our current systems from new forms of attack. This brings us to the question at the heart of 9/11: How do we anticipate the next set of threats before the next major attack takes place? We discovered in our work on the 9/11 Commission that our government had missed clues showing the new set of al Qaeda threats. So we must now ask again: Is the national security system constructed after 9/11 in need of updating, moderate reform or a complete overhaul? New tactics and tools change the very nature of war. The battle between Ukraine and Russia is demonstrating the future to us utilizing AI, robots and drone swarms. It is also underscoring the necessity for fundamentally altering our outdated defense procurement system and proposing budgets that are strong yet smart. The modernization of China’s military is a top focus for us. Terrorism has not gone away but continues to skew toward proxies, asymmetrical threats and cyberattacks. Hypersonic weapons, space and biosecurity will increase in importance. Deep fakes and disinformation campaigns by foreign adversaries heighten domestic polarization and domestic radicalization concerns. The conflict with Iran shows us the limits of lethality and the vital importance of geography. The 9/11 Commission heard compelling and riveting stories from people describing their fears of a potential attack prior to 9/11. Former CIA Director George Tenet said he felt like his “hair was on fire,” given a heightened level of possible terror activity. Richard Clarke, the National Security Advisor for President Bush, speculated in a Presidential Daily Brief about an attack and titled the memo “Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.” Yes, we must never forget 9/11, but that is not enough on its own. We must constantly look ahead to where the next major plot will unfold. The alarm bells are ringing once again — let us act now to build a more resilient national security strategy moving forward. Tim Roemer, a former Democratic member of Congress from Indiana, was U.S. ambassador to India and a member of the 9/11 Commission.

Twenty-five years ago, the 9/11 terrorist attacks killed 2,977 people and left us with profound questions about our security that redound to this day. The 9/11 Commission Report , a best-selling book at the time, explained how failures of imagination, management, capability and policy contributed to our failure to prevent the attacks.

The existing national security system at that time had been built for Cold War threats — fighter aircraft, tanks, uniformed soldiers and conventional warfare. But a new threat had emerged, utilizing truck bombs, training recruits in caves and manipulating technology to battle in asymmetric environments.

Al Qaeda, a regional terrorist group, had been deploying new challenges to the U.S. around the world throughout the 1990s. It attacked U.S. embassies in Africa with truck bombs and hit the USS Cole with explosives in a small boat. It also attempted to topple a building in New York City .

U.S. security policies did not adapt fast enough, nor did our institutions change quickly enough, to counter a dynamic adversary testing our aging and vulnerable defenses.

The bipartisan 9/11 Commission, led by Republican Chairman Tom Kean and Democratic Vice Chair Lee Hamilton, faced long odds on a polarized Capitol Hill and before a frightened public. After working with Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) to create the 9/11 Commission, I found myself serving on it and keenly recognized our time and budget constraints.

Like most blue-ribbon commissions, we had very limited time. Even if we figured out the answers, we would face the significant problem of trying to pass our policy recommendations into law.

Fortunately, we had several wise policy makers on the commission, with legislative experience in state and federal government, and a highly talented non-partisan staff. Importantly, we also had support from the 9/11 family members in New York, New Jersey and Virginia. They did the important and praiseworthy work of holding our feet to the fire, insisting on full accountability and transparency. And once we had finished, they relentlessly and energetically pushed members of Congress and the White House to embrace our policy recommendations and pass them into law.

The 9/11 Commission proposed more than three dozen major policy recommendations. New and more agile organizations were created; many old stovepipes and bureaucratic structures were eliminated; and a multi-layered joint federal-state-local architecture was set up to encourage sharing information and integrating intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence was created to coordinate and manage the 17 various intelligence agencies across the government — to execute on long-term strategy and keep short-term politics out of the national security equation.

The commission also recommended establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center staffed with experienced personnel from various agencies to enforce the practice of joint duty. We could not afford to have the FBI and CIA not sharing sensitive information with each other.

REAL IDs were proposed across all 50 states for improving security, and the FBI instructed to build a new national security workforce with broad linguistic skills and deep analytical abilities.

Aviation security was paramount, since the terrorists had repeatedly targeted aircraft. Screening systems that prevent suspects from boarding planes or entering the country were included in our extensive commercial airline travel system for the first time. There were about 16 names on the “No-Fly List” prior to 9/11 — today that list today includes thousands, and TSA officers provide a vital national security function.

Early on, we discussed legislative strategy to engage Congress and persuade a skeptical White House to support our proposals. The 9/11 family organizations swarmed the Hill and invaded offices to persuade members to vote for our new ideas.

Bipartisan leadership also stepped up in Congress. Sens. McCain, Susan Collins (R-Maine), Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) and House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) were all key to formulating and passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law.

To this day, our new system has performed well — we have not experienced another such attack. But Congress failed to enact a key proposal for itself. Experts informed the commission that Congress that 92 various committees and subcommittees maintained some jurisdiction over homeland security. When everyone claims oversight, no one really has responsibility.

Threats continue to evolve as corporations, universities, critical infrastructure and electrical and water grids are all experiencing cyberattacks. Last month, seven states reported serious attacks on water and utility related infrastructure. Iran, China, and Russia are likely culprits — all have serious capabilities in this area and a recent history of launching cyberattacks against the U.S. If the 9/11 attacks hit our airport infrastructure, today’s soft underbelly is our digital infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency was created in 2019 to protect us from this threat, but it currently has only an acting director (not confirmed) and its professional staff has been reduced by one-third . The Iran War invites more cybersecurity concerns for the homeland as we interface with old infrastructure to protect our current systems from new forms of attack.

This brings us to the question at the heart of 9/11: How do we anticipate the next set of threats before the next major attack takes place? We discovered in our work on the 9/11 Commission that our government had missed clues showing the new set of al Qaeda threats. So we must now ask again: Is the national security system constructed after 9/11 in need of updating, moderate reform or a complete overhaul?

New tactics and tools change the very nature of war. The battle between Ukraine and Russia is demonstrating the future to us utilizing AI, robots and drone swarms. It is also underscoring the necessity for fundamentally altering our outdated defense procurement system and proposing budgets that are strong yet smart.

The modernization of China’s military is a top focus for us. Terrorism has not gone away but continues to skew toward proxies, asymmetrical threats and cyberattacks. Hypersonic weapons, space and biosecurity will increase in importance. Deep fakes and disinformation campaigns by foreign adversaries heighten domestic polarization and domestic radicalization concerns. The conflict with Iran shows us the limits of lethality and the vital importance of geography.

The 9/11 Commission heard compelling and riveting stories from people describing their fears of a potential attack prior to 9/11. Former CIA Director George Tenet said he felt like his “hair was on fire,” given a heightened level of possible terror activity. Richard Clarke, the National Security Advisor for President Bush, speculated in a Presidential Daily Brief about an attack and titled the memo “Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.”

Yes, we must never forget 9/11, but that is not enough on its own. We must constantly look ahead to where the next major plot will unfold. The alarm bells are ringing once again — let us act now to build a more resilient national security strategy moving forward.

Tim Roemer, a former Democratic member of Congress from Indiana, was U.S. ambassador to India and a member of the 9/11 Commission.